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PREFERRING WHITE LIVES: THE RACIAL
ADMINISTRATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN
MARYLAND
MICHAEL MILLEMANN*
GARY W. CHRISTOPHER**
I. THE HISTORICAL INFLUENCE OF RACE IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF
THE DEATH PENALTY
The Maryland General Assembly enacted the current Death
Penalty Law in 1978.1 However, Maryland's experience with the
death penalty dates back to early colonial times.2 In Colonial
Maryland, a variety of crimes were punishable by death,3 including
grand larceny, then defined as theft of property worth "over twelve
pence."4 This continued the English practices of the day.5 By 1810,
Maryland's General Assembly had limited the death penalty to the
"crimes of first-degree murder, rape, arson, and treason. '6
Extrajudicial executions, however, were common. From the late
nineteenth century through the mid-twentieth century, at least twenty-
nine Marylanders-nearly all of them African-American-were
lynched.7
By the time data on the legal administration of the death
penalty was available, it became apparent that the selection of who
lived and died was heavily skewed by race. Between 1923 and 1962,
the State executed 79 men, of whom "62 were Negro and 17 were
white." 8 Twenty-one of the Negroes were executed for rape, 41 for
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1. 1978 Md. Laws 6.
2. COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT TO THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL OF MARYLAND 5 (1962) [hereinafter REPORT OF
THE COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT].
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 6.
7. Avis Thomas-Lester, Descendants Share the Legacy of Lynching: Linked by Grief
Relatives Meet at Capitol, WASH. POST, July 7, 2005, at T08.
8. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 2, at 8; WILLIAM J.
BOWERS, LEGAL HOMICIDE: DEATH AS PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA, 1864-1982, at 446-48 (1984).
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murder. 9 These experiences prompted a 1962 legislative committee on
capital punishment to comment, in understated fashion, that "the
Negro has had a greater chance of execution upon sentence of death
than .. . the white offender . . . ."10 By a 5-2 vote, the Capital
Punishment Committee of the Legislative Council concluded that
capital punishment ought to be abolished. I It recommended a phased-
in approach: "that the Legislature accept the principle of abolition as a
goal and adopt a plan for the gradual removal of capital punishment in
our State."
'' 2
By 1972, the United States Supreme Court had reached a
similar conclusion to that of the Capital Punishment Committee under
the United States Constitution. In Furman v. Georgia,13 the Supreme
Court held the death penalty unconstitutional, in major part, because it
discriminated in its administration against racial minorities and the
poor. 14  In 1976, after many states had re-enacted death penalty
statutes they contended would eliminate discrimination based on race
(as well as other factors), the Supreme Court reconsidered the issue
and upheld the constitutionality of the death penalty. In Gregg v.
Georgia,15 the Supreme Court based its conclusion on a prediction,
stating that "the concerns expressed in Furman that the penalty of
death not be imposed in an arbitrary or capricious manner can be met
by a carefully drafted statute that ensures that the sentencing authority
9. Id. During the mid-twentieth century, Maryland's governors made substantial use of
the commutation power in capital cases. During 1936-1961, of 102 prisoners sentenced to
death, "57 were executed, 34 were commuted to life, 9 received a new trial, [and] 2 committed
suicide .... Id. at 10-11.
10. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 2, at 35 (emphasis
added). The Committee found that unmarried offenders, as compared to married offenders,
also had a greater chance of being executed for comparable crimes. Id.
11. Id. at 38.
12. Id.
13. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
14. Justice Marshall reviewed the extensive history of race discrimination in the
administration of the death penalty, concluding that "Negroes [have been] executed far more
often than whites in proportion to their percentage of the population." 408 U.S. at 364
(Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Stewart said that "if any basis can be discerned for the
selection of these few to be sentenced to die, it is the constitutionally impermissible basis of
race." Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Douglas contended that the discretion of
decisionmakers in capital cases often resulted in discrimination "against the accused if he is
poor and despised, and lacking political clout, or if he is a member of a suspect or unpopular
minority," and preferences for "those who by social position may be in a more protected
position." Id. at 255 (Douglas, J., concurring).
15. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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is given adequate information and guidance. ' 6 Unfortunately, this
prediction has not proven to be accurate.
II. THE CONTEMPORARY INFLUENCE OF RACE IN THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE DEATH PENALTY
As of October 13, 2004, there were seven men on death row in
Maryland. 17 All seven, of which five were black, had been convicted
of killing whites. 18 These profiles suggest that race, especially the race
of the victim, still plays a significant and unacceptable role in the
administration of the ultimate punishment in Maryland. A 2003
statewide survey confirms this theory. Prior to analyzing this study,
we review the concerns that led to it.
In 1992, Governor William Donald Schaefer convened a
commission to review certain aspects of Maryland's death penalty law,
including whether it was being fairly imposed. The Report of the
Governor's Commission on the Death Penalty, issued in November,
1993, was the first comprehensive collection of data on the operation
of Maryland's death penalty. 19 The Commission had conducted
regional hearings to consider the views and experiences of Maryland's
citizens and experts. A number of those who provided information to
the Commission complained "that the present system discriminates
against minorities and the poor.' 20 These concerns prompted the
Commission to examine the available sentencing data. Although the
data were incomplete, they indicated there had been disparities in the
race of the defendants and victims in the frequency with which the
death penalty had been sought and imposed. 21  As a result, the
16. Id. at 195.
17. Julie Bykowicz & Jennifer McMenamin, Death Penalty Review Possible: Judge Sets
Execution Date then Issues Stay for Black Man: Defense Plans Racial Bias Appeal: UM Study
to be Used to Contest Md. Capital Punishment Law, BALT. SUN, Oct. 22, 2004, at I B.
18. Id.; see also Lawrence Hurley, Prince George's County Prosecutors to Seek Death
Warrant in Convicted Murderer's Case, DAILY RECORD, Oct. 13, 2004.
19. GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON THE DEATH PENALTY, REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S
COMISSION ON THE DEATH PENALTY: AN ANALYSIS OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN MARYLAND,
1978-1993 (1993) [hereinafter GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION REPORT].
20. Id. at 79.
21. Id. at 102-05 & app. B.
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Commission observed that "racial disparities in [the death penalty's]
implementation remain a matter of legitimate concern."
22
In 1996, Governor Parris Glendening appointed a Task Force
on the Fair Imposition of Capital Punishment in Maryland to undertake
"further inquiry...to determine the causes of racial disparities in the
administration of the death penalty in Maryland. 23  However, the
Task Force was given no budget and had only five months to complete
its inquiry. Nevertheless, it concluded "that the high percentage of
African-American prisoners under sentence of death and.. .the low
percentage of prisoners under sentence of death whose victims were
African-American remains a cause for concern," and "the potential for
race to constitute a factor in the administration of justice exists. ' 24
During the 2000 General Assembly session, Governor
Glendening committed $225,000 to fund an empirical study to collect
all of the data necessary to determine whether race operates as a factor
in Maryland capital sentencing. 25  Dr. Raymond Paternoster, a
Professor with the University of Maryland Department of Criminology
and Criminal Justice, was assigned the task of conducting the study.
In May of 2002, Governor Glendening imposed a moratorium on
executions in the State pending the release of the Paternoster Study.
26
He acted out of continuing concern that the death penalty was being
administered in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner. That concern
arose from an interim study on the issue entitled: Race of Victim and
Race of Defendant Disparities in the Administration of Maryland's
Capital Charging and Sentencing System (1978-1999): Preliminary
Finding.27 Professors David C. Baldus and George Woodworth of the
22. Id. at 201. The Commission lacked the resources to conduct the sophisticated
statistical analysis needed to reveal whether factors other than race accounted for the
disparities. The Commission also found that "[c]apital prosecutions under Maryland's 1978
death penalty statute are distributed among the State's twenty-four charging jurisdictions in
numerically uneven fashion." Id. at 198. Noting that "a death sentence should be
proportionate to the gravity of the murder committed and not dependent on its geographical
location," the Commission favored the adoption of measures that would achieve "a more
uniform enforcement of the death penalty." Id. at 200-01.
23. Maryland Exec. Order No. 01.01.1996.16 (1996).
24. REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE FAIR IMPOSITION OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN
MARYLAND 39, 41 (1996).
25. Sarah Koenig, Doubts on Halt to Death Penalty: 1-Year Moratorium in Senate Bill
Falls Short, Professor Says, BALT. SUN, Apr. 5, 2001, at lB.
26. Francis X. Clines, Death Penalty is Suspended in Maryland, N.Y. TIMES, May I0,
2002, at A20.
27. David C. Baldus & George Woodworth, Race of Victim and Race of Defendant
Disparities in the Administration of Maryland's Capital Charging and Sentencing System
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University of Iowa had prepared this interim study documenting the
effects of race based on data gathered by the Governor's Commission
on the Death Penalty and the Maryland Office of the Public
Defender. 28 The interim study found that it was more likely that the
cases of Maryland defendants accused of killing white victims would
29
advance to penalty proceedings. This was "principally a product of
prosecutorial decisions that advance cases to a penalty trial.",30  The
interim study also indicated that it was more likely yet that the
defendants in the white-victim cases would be sentenced to death.3'
The black defendant/white victim combination was the most toxic of
all; this combination was much more likely to produce a death
sentence than any other.
32
In 2003, Dr. Paternoster published the results of the largest
empirical study of capital cases in state history.33 Paternoster's study
encompassed all first- and second-degree murder convictions from
1978-1999 and a number of additional cases in which defendants were
charged with, but not convicted of, first or second degree murder.
34
An understanding of the study requires a basic knowledge of the
extensive process of capital cases in Maryland, which includes all of
the typical criminal procedures along with the added layer of death
penalty procedures.
The process begins with a notice from the prosecutor that the
State intends to seek the death penalty. 35  There are no statewide
standards that govern or even inform the prosecutorial decision. The
only practical requirement is that there must be adequate evidence, in
the prosecutor's view, that the homicide was "aggravated" in one of
the ways prescribed by the statute; 36  otherwise, prosecutorial
(1976-1996): Preliminary Finding (Feb. 14, 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
University of Maryland Law Journal of Race, Religion, Gender and Class).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Raymond Paternoster et al., Justice by Geography and Race: The Administration of
the Death Penalty in Maryland, 1978-1999, 4 MARGINS 1, 1 (2004) [hereinafter PATERNOSTER
ARTICLE]. The study was commissioned by the Governor of Maryland. It was comprehensive.
Dr. Paternoster and his associates reviewed extensive data, including prisoner files,
presentence investigations, prosecution files, and reports prepared by trial judges in capital
cases pursuant to Md. Rule 4-343, among other data.
34. Id. at 15-16.
35. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-202(a) (LexisNexis 2002). The death notice must
be filed "at least 30 days before trial."
36. Id.
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discretion is unlimited. This gives the Death Penalty Law, with the
ultimate punishment that it allows, the quality of a local ordinance.
Some prosecutors seek death penalties regularly, others rarely and
some, not at all.37 For example, of the 76 death sentences handed
down in Maryland since 1978, 34 (45 percent) were imposed in
Baltimore County, a jurisdiction in which the prosecutor regularly
seeks the death penalty despite only 12 percent of the State's death-
eligible cases occurring in Baltimore County.38  Eight of the 12
prisoners on death row as of January, 2004 were convicted in
Baltimore County. 39 By comparison, 44 percent of the State's death
eligible cases occur in Baltimore City, yet Baltimore City only hands
down 13 percent of the state's death sentences.4 °
There are also procedural differences in the guilt/innocence
trials of non-capital and capital trials. For example, jury selection is
more exhaustive in death penalty cases (the defendant is given 20
peremptory challenges and the State is given 10 for each defendant).4'
However, most of the special procedures in a death penalty case are
part of the sentencing proceeding. For example, a defendant has the
right to have a jury impose the sentence, even if the guilt/innocence
phase was before a judge or the defendant pled guilty.42 In addition, in
a capital trial, the decision-maker must consider whether the defendant
is death-eligible, e.g., because the defendant killed with his own hands
(is a first degree principal), and if so, he must then consider and weigh
aggravating against mitigating evidence before deciding whether to
impose one of three sentences: death, life without parole, or life with
parole.43 The rules make a broad array of evidence admissible.44
Following the presentation of evidence and arguments, the
decision-maker uses a sentencing form, pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-
343, as guidance in making a decision and/or to record its decision.
37. PATERNOSTER ARTICLE, supra note 33, at 56 fig. 5.
38. See Id. at 24, 28.
39. Id. at 1-2.
40. Id. at 28.
41. MD. R. 4-313(2). A defendant facing the possibility of life without parole also
receives twenty peremptory challenges.
42. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW §2-303(c) (LexisNexis Supp. 2005).
43. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW §2-303 (LexisNexis Supp. 2005).
44. The rules leave broad discretion for evidence in capital sentencing. Specifically
admissible are mitigating or aggravating circumstances, prior criminal convictions or lack
thereof, the presentence investigation report, and "any other evidence the court finds to have
probative value and relevance to sentencing, if the defendant has a fair opportunity to rebut
any statement." MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW §2-303(e)(l)(v) (LexisNexis Supp. 2005).
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The form records decisions about whether the defendant was an
eligible first-degree principal, whether the defendant was exempt from
the death penalty because of mental retardation, which aggravating
circumstances and mitigating circumstances were established, and
what the sentence will be. 45 The jury then sentences the defendant,
and the judge cannot override their decision. If the jury cannot decide
unanimously, the sentence cannot be death.46  At the end of the
47proceeding, the trial judge must complete a report about the case.
The Paternoster Study identified 1,311 death eligible cases
48from a pool of approximately 6,000 homicides. In 353 of those
cases, prosecutors filed death notices.49  Prosecutors later withdrew
140 of these notifications.50 Of the remaining 213 cases, 180 reached
the penalty phase, and in 76 of these cases, the defendant was
sentenced to death. 5' The Paternoster Study concluded that a person
charged with a death eligible crime has roughly a one-in-six (16
percent) chance of being a defendant in a capital proceeding, 52 and
one-in-seventeen (5.8 percent) chance of receiving a death sentence.53
However, these risks are not distributed equally amongst criminal
defendants as race is a factor throughout the process.
The victims were white in only 44 percent of Maryland's death
54
eligible cases. Yet, in 66% of the cases in which prosecutors gave
death notifications, the victims were white, and in 80% of the cases in
which the death penalty was imposed, the victims were white.
55
Moreover, prosecutors filed death notices over twice (2.5 times) as
often when a white person was killed as when a black person was
45. For a complete overview of the form, see GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra
note 19, at 35-44.
46. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-303(j)(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2005).
47. MD. R. 4-343(k).
48. PATERNOSTER ARTICLE, supra note 33, at 18-19. The study defined "death eligible"
as when (1) "[t]he state's attorney filed a notice of an intention to seek a death sentence, even
if that notice was later withdrawn unilaterally or in exchange for a plea" or when a panel of
experienced criminal law attorneys determined (2) "[t]he facts of the case clearly established
that a first-degree murder was committed, the defendant was the principal in the first degree
(or met the principle in the second-degree exception), the defendant was eligible by age at the
time of the offense, the defendant was not mentally retarded at the time of the offense, and the
murder included at least one statutory aggravating circumstance." Id. at 18.
49. Id. at 20; MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW §2-202(a) (LexisNexis 2002).
50. PATERNOSTER ARTICLE, supra note 33, at 20.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 25.
55. Id.
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killed (42% versus 17%).56 Worse, it was more than five times more
likely that a death sentence would be imposed when the victim was
white.57 Death sentences were imposed in 12% of the death eligible
cases when a white person was killed, as compared to 2% of the cases
when a person of color was killed.58
After their initial analysis of the data, Dr. Paternoster and his
associates took a series of statistically accepted steps to determine
whether the outcomes in these cases could be explained by factors
other than race. They identified 123 "covariates"-factors that might
have played a role in the sentencing outcomes. 59 In addition to these
covariates were "county factors," which accounted for disparities that
were the results of different prosecutorial policies in the 23 political
subdivisions in Maryland. For example, prosecutors in Baltimore
County, which is a predominantly white jurisdiction, regularly seek the
death penalty, while prosecutors in Baltimore City, which is
disproportionately black, rarely do so.
61
After using multi-variable logistic regression models, Dr.
Paternoster and his associates looked at the disparities when factoring
in the race of the victim and defendant. Dr. Paternoster found that the
race of the victim continues to play a statistically disproportionate role,
although the extent of the disparities was reduced. In sum, there was a
1.7 greater chance that a person who allegedly killed a white victim
56. Id. at 26-27.
57. Id. at 26.
58. RAYMOND PATERNOSTER ET AL., AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF MARYLAND'S DEATH
SENTENCING SYSTEM WITH RESPECT TO THE INFLUENCE OF RACE AND LEGAL JURISDICTION 22
& tbl.2 (2003), available at http://www.newsdesk.umd.edu/pdf/finalrep.pdf [hereinafter
PATERNOSTER STUDY]; see also RAYMOND PATERNOSTER ET AL., AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF
MARYLAND'S DEATH SENTENCING SYSTEM WITH RESPECT TO THE INFLUENCE OF RACE AND
LEGAL JURISDICTION: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 17 & fig.4 (2003), available at
http://www.newsdesk.umd.edu/pdf/exec.pdf.
59. PATERNOSTER ARTICLE, supra note 33, at 58 tbl. 1.
60. Id.
61. PATERNOSTER ARTICLE, supra note 33, at 28:
Baltimore County homicides comprise only .12 of all death eligible
homicides in the state but .28 of the death notifications, .39 of all
notifications that "stick", .42 of all penalty trials, and .45 of all death
sentences. Baltimore County, therefore, which only contributed 12% to the
total number death eligible homicides in the state from 1978-1999, was
responsible for almost one-half of the total number of death sentences that
were imposed.
Id. Translating these data, after adjusting the statistics by discounting for other factors, "the
probability that a notification to seek death will be filed in Baltimore County is over 13 times
higher than in adjacent Baltimore City .... five times greater than ... in Montgomery County,
and three times greater than... in Anne Arundel County. Id. at 33.
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would receive a death notice as compared to a person who allegedly
killed a black victim. 62 Thus, a person who kills a white victim is
more than three times as likely to get the death sentence than a person
who kills a non-white victim. 63  When race of the defendant was
factored in, the disparities grew in even more significant respects.
Black defendants who kill white victims are more than twice as likely
to receive death notifications as black offenders who kill black
victims.64 Black defendants who kill white victims are 2.5 times more
likely to be sentenced to death than whites who kill whites, and they
are 3.6 times more likely to be sentenced to death than blacks who kill
blacks.65
The statistical bottom line is this: after controlling for all other
variables, including different jurisdictional practices, it was more than
twice as likely that a defendant would be sentenced to death when the
victim was white than when the victim was black. 66  In black
defendant/white victim cases, it was 1.8 times more likely that
prosecutors would give death notifications, and 2.6 times more likely
67that a death sentence would be imposed.
Three years before the Paternoster Study was released, two
judges of the Maryland Court of Appeals, including its Chief Judge,
concluded that there is a "strong argument" that "there is little or no
rationality underlying the actual imposition of the death penalty in
Maryland, and that the penalty disproportionately falls on poor
African-American males accused of murdering white victims." 68 This
was based on over two decades of judicial experiences with the death
penalty.
The judges added that, although in theory the Maryland Death
Penalty Law is supposed to apply to "the more heinous first degree
murders," there is "a strong argument...that, in practice, the statute has
62. Id. at 37.
63. Id. at 37-38.
64. Id. at 39.
65. Id. at 39-40.
66. Id. at 39.
67. Id. at 92 tbl.9G. The Paternoster Study is consistent with many others throughout the
country. See John H. Blume et al., Post-McCleskey Racial Discrimination Claims in Capital
Cases, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 1771, 1774 (1998) ("There is no question that both the historical
and the current imposition of the death penalty in this country are racially discriminatory.
Nearly every study, including the federal government's General Accounting Office review of
twenty-eight studies, has come to this conclusion.").
68. Colvin-E1 v. State, 359 Md. 49, 55, 753 A.2d 13, 16 (2000) (Eldridge, J., joined by
Bell, C.J., dissenting).
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utterly failed to produce this result," but rather "that, in Maryland,
"this uniqIue penalty" has been "wantonly and . . . freakishly
imposed." 9 As described above, the Paternoster Study confirmed the
accuracy of these judicial comments.
III. RACE-BASED ARGUMENTS UNDER THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION
A. The Supreme Court's Decision in McCleskey v. Kemp
In McCleskey v. Kemp, a deeply divided Supreme Court held
that a statewide statistical study indicating that race played a factor in
death penalty determinations was insufficient evidence to establish that
McCleskey's death sentence had been unconstitutionally imposed
under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution.7 1 Justice Powell, joined by four Justices, delivered the
opinion of the Court, one that he would later come to regret.72 The
four remaining justices dissented in three separate opinions.
McCleskey was convicted of murder and sentenced to death
after his involvement in an armed robbery during which a police
officer was killed.73  In a subsequent federal habeas corpus
proceeding, McCleskey offered a statistical study, which demonstrated
race-based disparities in Georgia's administration of the death penalty,
in support of his equal protection and cruel and unusual punishment
arguments.74 The Majority of the Court said that the study did not
contain particularized evidence that the "decisionmakers in [his] case
acted with discriminatory purpose., 75 Justice Powell acknowledged
that the Court had "accepted statistics as proof of intent to discriminate
in certain limited contexts.', 76 He gave two examples, jury venire-
selection and Title VII cases:
69. Id. (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 310 (1972) (Stewart, J.,
concurring)).
70. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
71. Id.
72. See infra Part III(A)(2). See also Linda Greenhouse, Lewis Powell, Crucial Centrist
Justice, Dies at 90, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1988, at Al.
73. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 283-85.
74. Id. at 286.
75. Id. at 297.
76. Id. at 293.
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First, this Court has accepted statistical disparities as
proof of an equal protection violation in the selection of
the jury venire in a particular district. Although
statistical proof normally must present a "stark" pattern
to be accepted as the sole proof of discriminatory intent
under the Constitution, "because of the nature of the
jury-selection task,...we have permitted a finding of
constitutional violation even when the statistical pattern
does not approach [such] extremes." Second, this Court
has accepted statistics in the form of multiple-
regression analysis to prove statutory violations under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 77
Justice Powell distinguished these two examples, reasoning
that venire-selection and Title VII cases involve discrete decisions and
contain contexts in which the facts are more limited and there are
fewer variables involved in the decisions. 78 Moreover, in these cases,
"the decisionmaker has an opportunity to explain the statistical
disparity. '79  By comparison, the study in McCleskey implicated
decisions of prosecutors, judges and juries statewide, making it
difficult for the state actors in McCleskey's case to respond to it.
Justice Powell said, for example, that "[r]equiring a prosecutor [in a
single jurisdiction] to rebut a study that analyzes the past conduct of
scores of prosecutors is quite different from requiring a prosecutor to
rebut a contemporaneous challenge to his own acts." 80
This reasoning becomes more attenuated, however, as the
geographical scope of the race discrimination claim shrinks, and as it
focuses on the actions of a more limited number of key actors, and
especially on the decisions of prosecutors. Such a race-based death
penalty claim approximates a race-based jury selection claim-"the
selection of the jury venire in a particular district" 81 -which Justice
Powell acknowledged can be proved with statistics because it involves
discrete decisions, a limited context, and fewer variables. We return to
this point in Part IV(B), in which we argue that Maryland's courts
77. Id. at 293-94 (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metro. Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 266 & n.13 (1977) and citing Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 400-01 (1986)
(Brennan, J., concurring in part)) (footnotes omitted).
78. Id. at 294-95.
79. Id. at 296.
80. Id. at 296 n.17 (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)).
81. Id. at 293.
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should apply the constitutional rules governing race-based jury
selection claims to the findings of the Paternoster Study.
In rejecting McCleskey's Eighth Amendment "cruel and
unusual punishment" argument, Justice Powell described a variety of
post-Furman procedural protections that states, including Georgia, had
developed to protect capital defendants from arbitrary decisions. 82 His
ultimate conclusion, however, was based on a judgment-that the
study's evidence of race discrimination did not pose an "unacceptable
risk of racial prejudice influencing capital sentencing decisions.' 83 In
other words, Justice Powell held that the study "does not demonstrate a
constitutionally significant risk of racial bias affecting the Georgia
capital sentencing process."8 4 Rather, in Powell's view, at best, the
study "indicate[d] a discrepancy that appears to correlate with race." 85
Dissenting, Justice Brennan criticized the Majority for
upholding a system where "lawyers must tell their clients that race
casts a large shadow on the capital sentencing process." 86  Justice
Brennan argued that it was irrelevant that McCleskey could not prove
that race was a factor in his sentence because the constitutional
violation was the "risk of the imposition of an arbitrary sentence,
rather than the proven fact of one."037 Justice Brennan disagreed with
the Court's analysis, stating that "[d]efendants challenging their death
sentences [] never have had to prove that impermissible considerations
have actually infected sentencing decisions." Justice Brennan argued
that the proper Eighth Amendment test is to determine whether there is
a "pattern of arbitrary and capricious sentencing."
89
Justice Blackmun also dissented, with the biting comment that
the majority gave "a new meaning to our recognition that death is
different" by applying a "lesser standard of scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause." 90 He said that "concerns" that race had played a
role in McCleskey's death sentence "are central not only to the
principles underlying the Eighth Amendment, but also to the principles
82. Id. at 303-04.
83. Id. at 309.
84. Id. at 313.
85. Id. at 312.
86. Id. at 321-22 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
87. Id. at 322 (Brennan, J. dissenting) (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)).
88. Id. at 324 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
89. Id. at 323 (Brennan, J. dissenting) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195
n.46 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)).
90. Id. at 347-48 (Blackmun, J. dissenting).
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underlying the Fourteenth Amendment." 91 He criticized the majority
for "treat[ing] the case as if it is limited to challenges to the actions of
two specific decisionmaking bodies-the petit jury and the state
legislature." 92 He argued that "[t]his self-imposed restriction enables
the Court to distinguish this case from the venire-selection cases and
cases under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in which it long
has accepted statistical evidence and has provided an easily applicable
framework for review." 93 Justice Blackmun noted that:
A significant aspect of [McCleskey's] claim is that
racial factors impermissibly affected numerous steps in
the Georgia capital sentencing scheme between his
indictment and the jury's vote to sentence him to death.
The primary decisionmaker at each of the intervening
steps of the process is the prosecutor, the quintessential
state actor in a criminal proceeding.
94
Justice Blackmun "concentrate [d] on the decisions within the
prosecutor's office through which the State decided to seek the death
penalty and, in particular, the point at which the State proceeded to the
penalty phase after conviction;" a step, in his belief, at which "the
evidence of the effect of the racial factors was especially strong.
95
The Paternoster Study came to the same conclusion.
96
Justice Blackmun stated that the majority "nowhere explains
why this limitation on prosecutorial discretion does not require the
same analysis that we apply in other cases involving equal protection
challenges to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion." 97  He cited
Batson v. Kentucky, 98 in which the Court invalidated the use of race-
based peremptory challenges to venire jurors, in support of his
argument that statistical proof of race discrimination can establish the
proponent's prima facie case. 99 He concluded that McCleskey had
made a "prima facie case of purposeful discrimination by showing that
91. Id. at 346 (Blackmun, J. dissenting).
92. Id. at 350 (Blackmun, J. dissenting).
93. Id. (Blackmun, J. dissenting).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 351.
96. PATERNOSTER ARTICLE, supra note 33, at 48.
97. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 351 n.3 (Blackmun, J. dissenting).
98. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
99. Id. at 94.
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the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of
discriminatory purpose" and, thus, the State had the burden to "rebut
that case."
' 100
Although many courts have read McCleskey broadly in
rejecting federal constitutional challenges to death sentences based on
race discrimination, 0 1 there are reasons to give it a more limited
effect. 102 As indicated above, the basis for the majority opinion erodes
when the race-based challenge is more limited, both by jurisdiction
and actor. Indeed, in a decision after McCleskey, the Supreme Court
held that courts should "draw on 'ordinary equal protection
standards"' to resolve a claim that a prosecutorial decision is based on
race, i.e., a "selective-prosecution claim." 10 3 These standards envision
giving significant weight to racial effect in demonstrating a racial
purpose.
B. The Reaction to McCleskey
The criticism of McCleskey has been severe and enduring.
Commentators have called it "logically unsound, morally
reprehensible, and legally unsupportable,"104 "grievously flawed,"
' 10 5
and "morally inconsistent with the essential principles of
100. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 351-52 (Blackmun, J. dissenting) (quoting Batson, 476 U.S.
at 94) (footnote omitted).
101. See, e.g., Coleman v. Mitchell, 268 F.3d 417, 441 (6th Cir. 2001) ("The Supreme
Court in McCleskey established a demanding evidentiary standard for finding prosecutorial
abuse of discretion in seeking the death penalty ...."); Sexton v. French, 163 F.3d 874, 888
(4th Cir. 1998) (holding that McCleskey "set forth very exacting standards for entitlement to
constitutional relief based on statistical evidence of race-of-defendant and race-of-victim
effects. ... ); United States v. Webster, 162 F.3d 308, 334 (5th Cir. 1998) (denying
defendant's discovery request because his statistical evidence did not meet the standard in
McCleskey "which may allow finding a constitutional violation (or prima facie finding
thereof) in very limited circumstances if the data presents a 'stark' enough picture"); Davis v.
Greer, 13 F.3d 1134, 1144 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that the defendant's statistical studies
failed to establish "any constitutional violation and certainly does not provide the
exceptionally clear proof of discrimination required by McCleskey"); Harris v. Pulley, 885
F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1989) (upholding California's capital sentencing scheme despite a
statistical study demonstrating racial discrimination); Fuller v. Georgia State Bd. of Pardons &
Paroles, 851 F.2d 1307 (1 1th Cir. 1988) (denying defendant's challenge to a decision by the
Georgia Parole Board based on a statistical study).
102. See, e.g., Blume et al., supra note 67.
103. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996) (quoting Wayte v. United
States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985)).
104. The Supreme Court, 1986 Term: Leading Cases, 101 HARV. L. REV. 119, 158 (1987).
105. Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the
Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1389 (1988).
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retributivism," 106 and have argued that it "deprives [the Court] of any
credibility as a vehicle for achieving racial justice in our society." °7
State judges have been critical as well. 10 8  A unanimous
Supreme Court of New Jersey, in State v. Marshall,1° 9 reviewing a
claim of racial discrimination under its death penalty law, sharply
rejected the state's suggestion that the Court follow McCleskey's lead.
The New Jersey Court said:
New Jersey's history and traditions would never
countenance racial disparity in capital sentencing. As a
people, we are uniquely committed to the elimination of
racial discrimination. All of our institutions reflect that
commitment. We were among the first of the states that
enacted a civil rights law. "[Racial] discrimination
threatens not only the rights and proper privileges of the
inhabitants of the State but menaces the institutions and
foundation of a free democratic State . . . ." Our
decisional law has always reflected the "strength of the
State's policy" in this area. To countenance racial
106. Thorn Bassett, Risking Cruelty: McCleskey v. Kemp, Retributivism, and Ungrounded
Moral Judgment, 52 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 47 (2002).
107. DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 337 (Richard A. Epstein et al.
eds., 1992). See, e.g., SAMUEL R. GROSS & ROBERT MAURO, DEATH AND DISCRIMINATION:
RACIAL DISPARITIES IN CAPITAL SENTENCING 159-211 (1989); Stephen B. Bright,
Discrimination, Death and Denial: The Tolerance of Racial Discrimination in Infliction of the
Death Penalty, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 433, 480 (1995) (referring to McCleskey as a "badge
of shame upon American's [sic] system of justice"); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Unconscious Racism
and the Criminal Law, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 1016, 1016 (1988); Bryan A. Stevenson & Ruth
E. Friedman, Deliberate Indifference: Judicial Tolerance of Racial Bias in Criminal Justice,
51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 509, 510 (1994); Blume et al., supra note 67.
108. Maryland has yet to address the issue of statewide statistical studies as applied to the
constitutional application of the death penalty under the Declaration of Rights. McCleskey has
only been cited in three published Maryland cases, and none of them adopt any part of
McCleskey as a binding interpretation of the Declaration of Rights. See Oken v. State, 378 Md.
179, 191-94, 229 n.20, 835 A.2d 1105, 1112-14, 1134 n.20 (2003) (McCleskey is cited a
number of times within two quotations, one taken from Justice Scalia's opinion in Walton v.
Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 657-65 (1990), and the other a quotation from Penry v. Lynaugh, 492
U.S. 302, 327-28 (1989). None of the quotes pertain to the issues discussed in this article.);
Collins v. State, 318 Md. 269, 300, 568 A.2d 1, 16 (1990) (McCleskey cited along with a
number of other cases for the general proposition that defendant's case was not "aberrant,
arbitrary, capricious or freakish" where defendant did not introduce a statewide study or make
an equal protection and unrelated to a separate cruel and unusual challenge); White v. State,
125 Md. App. 684, 708 n.6, 726 A.2d 858, 869-70 n.6 (1999) (not actually citing McCleskey,
but instead citing a memorandum that Justice Scalia wrote to Justice Marshall regarding
McCleskey where he "acknowledged the existence of unconscious racism").
109. 130 N.J. 109, 613 A.2d 1059 (1992).
16 U. Md. L. J. of Race, Religion, Gender & Class [Vol. 5:1
discrimination in capital sentencing would mock that
tradition and our own constitutional guarantee of equal
protection of the laws under New Jersey Constitution
Article I, paragraph 1.
As a Court, we have repeatedly emphasized our
special commitment to equality in the administration of
justice. As we have stated, to exclude from jury service
qualified groups "'not only violates our Constitution
and the laws enacted under it but is at war with our
basic concepts of a democratic society and a
representative government."' The imposition of
capital-death sentences based solely on the race of the
defendant or the victim would be equally at war with
the basic concepts of a democratic society and a
representative government. 110
The New Jersey Court criticized the McCleskey majority for
"seem[ing] resigned to accept" racial disparities in capital sentencing,
and responded to McCleskey's concern that real review of racially
influenced death penalties would prove impractical by saying:
This Court cannot refuse to confront those terrible
realities. We have committed ourselves to determining
whether racial and ethnic bias exist in our judicial
system and to "recommend ways of eliminating it
wherever it is found." Hence, were we to believe that
the race of the victim and race of the defendant played a
significant part in capital-sentencing decisions in New
Jersey, we would seek corrective measures, and if that
failed we could not, consistent with our State's policy,
tolerate discrimination that threatened the foundation of
our system of law.
11 
'
110. Marshall, 130 N.J. at 207-08, 613 A.2d at 1108-09 (citations omitted). The
evidence of discrimination presented in Marshall was relatively weak, at least in relation to
what was presented in the Paternoster Report. "[Tihe only statistics presented by the Master
were the rate at which black defendants are sentenced to death and the rate at which cases with
white victims proceed to penalty trial." Id. at 210, 613 A.2d at 1110. No regression analysis
was undertaken adjusting for the case and geographic variables.
111. Id. at 209, 613 A.2d at 111 0 (citations omitted).
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Three dissenting members of Florida's Supreme Court, led by
its Chief Justice, expressed similar concerns in Foster v. State.
1
"
2
They said that McCleskey was simply inconsistent with the
commitment of the state and the Court to racial fairness, which
requires that claims of race discrimination in the administration of the
death penalty, as a matter of Florida constitutional law, should be
judged by a standard that gives substantial weight to "discriminatory
impact."1 13 The Chief Justice said:
Discrimination, whether conscious or
unconscious, cannot be permitted in Florida courts. As
important as it is to ensure a jury selection process free
from racial discrimination, it is infinitely more
important to ensure that the State is not imposing the
ultimate penalty of death in a racially discriminatory
manner. The U.S. Supreme Court may eventually
recognize that the burden imposed by McCleskey is as
insurmountable as that presented by Swain.114 In the
meantime, defendants such as Foster have no chance of
proving that application of the death penalty in a
particular jurisdiction is racially discriminatory, no
matter how convincing their evidence. 1
5
Remarkably, even McCleskey's author, Justice Lewis Powell,
eventually came to view his vote in McCleskey as a mistake, saying,
after he retired, that he regretted that decision. 116
IV. RACE DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS BASED ON THE PATERNOSTER
STUDY AND SIMILAR EVIDENCE OF JURISDICTIONAL DISCRIMINATION
UNDER THE MARYLAND DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
We believe that it is the potential combination of evidence that
raises serious race discrimination issues, i.e., the evidence in the
112. 614 So. 2d 455, 465 (Fla. 1992) (Barkett, C.J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 467 (Barkett, C.J., dissenting).
114. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
115. Foster, 614 So. 2d. at 466 (Barkett, C.J., dissenting).
116. See David Von Drehle, Retired Justice Changes Stand On Death Penalty, WASH.
POST, June 10, 1994, at Al ("John C. Jeffries Jr., author of 'Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr.: A
Biography,' writes that he asked during a 1991 interview if Powell would change any of his
votes if he could. 'Yes,' Powell answered, 'McCleskey v. Kemp."').
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statewide Paternoster Study combined with similar evidence in the
jurisdiction in which a constitutional challenge is presented. We begin
with an analysis of the independent role of the provisions of
Maryland's Declaration of Rights.
A. The Relevance of Maryland's Declaration of Rights, and the
State's History and Experiences with Capital Punishment
In his dissenting opinion in Colvin-El v. State, 17 Judge
Eldridge, joined by Chief Judge Bell, pointed out the provisions of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights that are implicated by the arbitrary
and racially discriminatory administration of Maryland's death
penalty. These include the implicit "equal protection component of
Article 24,"ll18 and the prohibitions of "cruel and unusual pains and
penalties" and "cruel or unusual punishment" contained, respectively,
in Articles 16 and 25.119
There are competing views about the weight that Maryland's
courts should give to the Supreme Court's decision in McCleskey in
applying these provisions to a claim based on the Paternoster Study
and similar evidence of local discrimination. One view argues that
Maryland's courts should interpret state constitutional provisions "in
pari materia" with (in the same manner as) the analogous federal
provisions. 12  This lockstep approach has virtues, including
consistency and predictability. However, sometimes there are good
reasons for state courts to break ranks with the Court when they are
interpreting their own constitutions, and Maryland's appellate courts
117. 359 Md. 49, 55, 753 A.2d 13, 16(2000).
118. Article 24 provides: "That no man ought to be taken or imprisoned or disseized of
his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or, in any manner, destroyed, or
deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers, or by the Law of the
land." In construing it to include a guarantee of equal treatment, the Maryland Court of
Appeals has said: "concept of equal treatment" is "embodied in the due process requirement of
Article 24 of the Declaration of Rights." Attorney General of Maryland v. Waldron, 289 Md.
683,704, 426 A.2d 929, 940-41 (1981) (citing Bd. of Supervisors of Elections v. Goodsell, 284
Md. 279, 293 n.7, 396 A.2d 1033, 1040 n.7 (1979); Governor v. Exxon Corp., 279 Md. 410,
438 n.8, 370 A.2d 1102, 1118 n.8 (1977) affd, 437 U.S. 117 (1978); Bruce v. Dir., Dep't of
Chesapeake Bay Affairs, 261 Md. 585, 600, 276 A.2d 200, 208 (1971)).
119. Colvin-El, 359 Md. 49, 54-55, 753 A.2d 13, 16. Judge Eldridge explained that "[t]he
Maryland Constitution contains two 'cruel and unusual punishment' prohibitions. One,
directed at the General Assembly, is in Article 16 of the Declaration of Rights. The other,
directed at 'the Courts of Law,' is contained in Article 25 of the Declaration of Rights." Id. at
54, n.2, 753 A. 2d 13, 16 n.2.
120. Pickett v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 365 Md. 67, 77, 775 A.2d 1218, 1224 (2001).
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have recognized this. The Maryland Court of Appeals has said that the
federal and state constitutions "are independent of each other so that a
violation of one is not necessarily a violation of the other."'12 1 For
example, the state and federal due process provisions "are
independent, capable of divergent effect, [and] the two are so
intertwined that they, in essence, form a double helix, each
complementing the other."' 22 As a result of the willingness of many
state courts to give independent meaning to state constitutions, "[t]he
present function of state constitutions is as a second line of defense for
those rights protected by the federal Constitution and as an
independent source of supplemental rights unrecognized by federal
law."'
23
When a state court interprets its constitution to protect a right
that the Court has not recognized, or has recognized but has not
adequately protected, it plays an important role in our Federalism.
124
This is not a new idea, but rather is part of the original conception of
the separation of powers.' It also is consistent with the differing
texts and histories of state constitutional provisions, and the differing
experiences and values of the states. And, as the Court has
recognized, there is no area in which states have stronger "Federalism"
interests than in the administration of criminal justice, including
capital punishment laws. 126 Thus, if a Court decision is wrong, as we
121. Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 640, 458 A.2d 758, 781
(1983) (citing Attorney General v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 704-05, 426 A.2d 929 (1981);
Pitsenberger v. Pitsenberger, 287 Md. 20, 27, 410 A.2d 1052 (1980); Governor v. Exxon
Corp., 279 Md. 410, 423, 372 A.2d 237 (1977), aft'd, 437 U.S. 117 (1978)).
122. Waldron, 289 Md. at 705,426 A.2d at 941 (1981).
123. Developments in the Law-The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95
HARV. L. REV. 1324, 1367 (1982).
124. See generally Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 85 (1980) (States
have an interest in "promoting more expansive rights of free speech and petition than
conferred by the Federal Constitution."); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983)
("Respect for the independence of state courts, as well as avoidance of rendering advisory
opinions, have been the cornerstones of this Court's refusal to decide cases where there is an
adequate and independent state ground. . .. 'It is fundamental that state courts be left free and
unfettered by [the Supreme Court] in interpreting their state constitutions."') (quoting
Minnesota v. Nat'l Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557 (1940)).
125. See, e.g., A.E. Dick Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of
the Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REV. 873, 935 (1976); Hans A. Linde, Book Review, 52 OR. L.
REV. 325 (1973); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 454 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(commenting on, and encouraging "emerging trend among high state courts of relying upon
state constitutional protections of individual liberties...").
126. See, e.g., James R. Acker & Elizabeth R. Walsh, Challenging the Death Penalty
Under State Constitutions, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1299, 1301 (1989) ("Death penalty laws
increasingly have been challenged under state constitutions, on a variety of grounds, in the
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believe McCleskey is, a state court has every reason to reject it in
interpreting its own constitution.
Moreover, the basic federal constitutional principles underlying
the death penalty are open-ended. This is true of constitutional
principles generally, but especially so in the Court's death penalty
jurisprudence. This not only allows, but requires, state judges to
exercise independent "judgment"-"reasoned judgment" in the words
of Justice O'Connor-in applying the principles. Thus, in interpreting
the Maryland Declaration of Rights' provisions, state courts can accept
the federal constitutional principles that govern the federal equal
protection and "cruel and unusual punishments" clauses, but apply
them in ways that are true to Maryland's "moral consensus" 127 about
the death penalty.
The "death is different '  principle, for example, requires that
decisions in capital cases be more "reliable" than in non-capital cases,
but leaves judges with substantial discretion to determine how much
more reliability is required and how to attain that greater degree of
required reliability. Similarly, the administration of the death penalty
must be consistent with "evolving standards of decency."' 29 In giving
content to that principle, state judges should look to the standards of
decency within their borders.
McCleskey rests in part on a judgment that the "risk of racial
prejudice influencing capital sentencing decisions" is not
"unacceptable."' 130  In Maryland, however, there are strong objective
indicators that this risk is unacceptable. Specifically, Maryland's
highest court has been vigilant in preventing and redressing race
discrimination, even when to do so it had to go beyond, or anticipate,
several states that retain capital punishment."); Joseph T. Walsh, The Evolving Role of State
Constitutional Law in Death Penalty Adjudication, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 341, 341
(2003) (this concept of "'new federalism' is but a corollary of the well established premise of
federal constitutional law that federal courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, will defer to
interpretation of state law as expounded by the highest court of a particular state."); id. at 348
(arguing that the "increased restrictions on the use of federal habeas corpus" will "actually
increase[] the effectiveness of state court review").
127. In upholding the constitutionality of the death penalty in 1976, the Supreme Court,
in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), deferred, in part, to "[c]onsiderations of federalism,
as well as respect for the ability of a legislature to evaluate, in terms of its particular State, the
moral consensus concerning the death penalty and its social utility as a sanction .... Id. at
186-87.
128. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188 (the Supreme Court has recognized in the past that "the
penalty of death is different in kind from any other punishment imposed under our system of
criminal justice.") (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)).
129. See Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1190 (2005) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958) (plurality opinion)).
130. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 309 (1987).
2005] Racial Administration of the Death Penalty in Maryland 21
rulings of the United States Supreme Court. For example, prior to
Batson v. Kentucky,131 the Maryland Court of Appeals observed that a
prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to exclude minority jurors
would be unconstitutional. 132 The Court of Appeals has also required,
in cases involving interracial crimes, that trial courts conduct voir dire
that seeks to expose racial bias, even though the Supreme Court has
not imposed this requirement. 133  And, the Court of Appeals has
reversed trials'in which parties have made racial appeals to jurors.1 34
Generally, Maryland has worked hard to prevent non-racial
arbitrariness in the administration of capital punishment. For example,
Maryland has given capital defendants the right to have a jury
determine the essential facts in the sentencing proceeding,1 35 and left
the final sentencing decision to the jury (unless the capital defendant
waives this right). 136  In 1987, eighteen years before the Supreme
Court's decision in Roper v. Simmons, 13 7 the General Assembly
prohibited the execution of those who were younger than eighteen
when they committed their crimes.13  In 1989, the legislature
prohibited the execution of the mentally retarded;139 this development
came thirteen years before the Supreme Court finally ended the
practice. 140 As a result of these and other procedural requirements,
only three people have been executed in Maryland since 1978.141 It is
wholly inconsistent with this tradition to allow race to play such a
prominent role in the capital process.
B. The Significance of the Paternoster Study and Similar Evidence of
Local Discrimination Under the Maryland Declaration of Rights
The Maryland Declaration of Rights has no express equality
provision; however the "concept of equal treatment" is "embodied in
131. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
132. Lawrence v. State, 295 Md. 557, 570, 457 A.2d 1127, 1133 (1983); Evans v. State,
304 Md. 487, 526-28, 499 A.2d 1261, 1281-82 (1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1010 (1986).
133. Bowie v. State, 324 Md. 1, 595 A.2d 448 (1991).
134. Tierco Maryland, Inc. v. Williams, 381 Md. 378, 849 A.2d 504 (2004).
135. In Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), the Supreme Court held this to be a federal
constitutional right.
136. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW §2-303 (LexisNexis Supp. 2005).
137. 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005).
138. 1987 Md. Laws 2907.
139. 1989 Md. Laws 3957.
140. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
141. David Nitkin, Curran 's Views Raise Concern over Conflict: Attorney General's Call
to Abolish Death Penalty Draws Rebukes from Some, BALT. SUN, June 16, 2004, at 6A.
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the due process requirement of Article 24 of the Declaration of
Rights." 14 2 Since Maryland has no express equal protection provision,
the Court of Appeals has held that Maryland's equal treatment rule is
"independent" and "capable of divergent effect" from the federal
provision. 1
43
The rejection of McCleskey would not leave Maryland's courts
without established standards to evaluate the findings of the
Paternoster Study and similar local findings. Indeed, as we suggested
previously (see Part III(A)), there are compelling reasons to use the
constitutional rules governing race-based jury selection claims to
evaluate the findings of the Paternoster Study. In sum, in those cases
in which capital defendants raise a race claim within a single
jurisdiction, and focus on the actions of a more limited number of key
actors (especially on the decisions of prosecutors), race-based death
penalty claims approximate race-based jury selection claims, in which
both Maryland's Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court have given
substantial weight to racial effect.
In Gilchrist v. State,144 the Maryland Court of Appeals
considered a challenge to the racially discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges based on the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.
The Court set forth the procedure that a trial court should use to
resolve such claims:
First, the complaining party has the burden of
making a prima facie showing that the other party has
142. Attorney General of Maryland v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 704, 426 A.2d 929, 940-41
(1981) (citing Bd. of Supervisors of Elections v. Goodsell, 284 Md. 279, 293 n.7, 396 A.2d
1033, 1040 (1979). In Waldron, the Court considered whether a state law prohibiting retired
judges from practicing law for compensation violated, inter alia, the state version of equal
protection embodied in Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The Court found
that the proper analysis of the issue did not fit within the Supreme Court's two-tiered Equal
Protection approach. Therefore, it resolved the issue (holding unconstitutional the law) by
identifying and applying a third, intermediate level of scrutiny which has no counterpart in
federal equal protection analysis. Id. at 710-28, 426 A.2d at 944-54. See also Governor v.
Exxon Corp., 279 Md. 410, 438 n.8, 370 A.2d 1102, 1118 n.8 (1977) aff d, 437 U.S. 117
(1978); Bruce v. Dir., Dep't of Chesapeake Bay Affairs, 261 Md. 585, 600, 276 A.2d 200, 208
(1971).
143. Waldron, 289 Md. at 705, 426 A.2d at 941. See also Hornbeck v. Somerset County
Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 458 A.2d 758 (1983) (evaluating the validity of the state education
funding scheme against the Equal Protection Clause and Article 24 of the Declaration of
Rights separately).
144. 340 Md. 606, 667 A.2d 876 (1995).
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exercised its peremptory challenges on an
impermissibly discriminatory basis, such as race or
gender. Moreover, "[w]hether the requisite prima facie
showing has been made is the trial judge's call...."
Second, once the trial court has determined that the
party complaining about the use of the peremptory
challenges has established a prima facie case, the
burden shifts to the party exercising the peremptory
challenges to rebut the prima facie case by offering
race-neutral explanations for challenging the excluded
jurors .... It is insufficient.. .for the party making the
peremptory challenges to "merely deny[] that he had a
discriminatory motive or... merely affirm[] his good
faith."
Finally, the trial court must "determine[] whether
the opponent of the strike has carried his burden of
proving purposeful discrimination." This includes
allowing the complaining party an opportunity to
demonstrate that the reasons given for the peremptory
challenges are pretextual or have a discriminatory
impact. It is at this stage "that the persuasiveness of the
,0145justification becomes relevant....
These familiar principles are well-suited to evaluate a race
discrimination claim based on the Paternoster Study and similar
evidence of local discrimination. Indeed, in his dissent in McCleskey,
Justice Blackmun noted that this approach "'progressively... sharpen[s]
the inquiry into the elusive factual question of intentional
discrimination. ' ' ' 14 6 A defendant would present a prima facie case of
discrimination, Justice Blackmun concluded, "by showing that the
totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory
purpose."'147 Whether that inference exists would depend on a three
part risk-based model of proof. 1
48
The first prong of the three part risk-based model of proof-
basically a standing issue-was plainly satisfied in McCleskey, Justice
145. Id. at 625-26, 667 A.2d at 885-86 (citations omitted).
146. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 351-52 n.4 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(quoting Texas Dep't of Comty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n.8 (1981)).
147. Id. at 351-52 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,
94 (1986)).
148. Id. at 352-53.
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Blackmun suggested, because McCleskey was black and the victim
was white, and the data demonstrated disparate treatment of such
defendants.149  The third prong, that "the allegedly discriminatory
procedure [was] susceptible to abuse or [was] not racially neutral,"
was also satisfied, Justice Blackmun believed, since the data
demonstrated that the discrimination occurred at the prosecutorial
selection stage. 150 However, with regards to the second prong-proof
of "a substantial likelihood that his death sentence is due to racial
factors,"-Justice Blackmun took note of the thoroughness of the
evidence presented, including proof of systemic and substantial
disparities by race of victim, all subjected to multiple regression
analysis confirming race to be the cause of the disparities. 151 Based on
this evidence, he concluded that the "showing is of sufficient
magnitude that, absent evidence to the contrary, one must conclude
that racial factors entered into the decision-making process that
yielded McCleskey's death sentence." 152  The burden thereupon
should shift, Justice Blackmun said, to the prosecution, to
"demonstrate that legitimate racially neutral criteria and procedures
yielded this racially skewed result." 153 Should the prosecution fail in
that burden, the defendant would have "demonstrated a clear pattern of
differential treatment according to race that is 'unexplainable on
grounds other than race.' 
154
In her dissent in Foster v. State,155 Chief Judge Barkett of the
Florida Supreme Court took the same approach:
I suggest the following standard: A party asserting
racial discrimination in the State's decision to seek the
death penalty should make a timely objection and
demonstrate on the record that the discrimination exists
and that there is a strong likelihood it has influenced the
State to seek the death penalty. Such discrimination
conceivably could be based on the race of the victim or
on the race of the defendant. Once the trial court
149. Id. at 353.
150. Id. at 352-53, 357-58.
151. Id. at 353.
152. Id. at 359.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 360-61 (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metro. Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 266 (1977)).
155. 614 So. 2d 455, 465 (Fla. 1992) (Barkett, C., dissenting).
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determines that the initial burden has been met by the
defendant, the burden then shifts to the State to show
that the practices in question are not racially motivated.
If the trial court determines that the State does not meet
that burden, the State then isprohibited from seeking
the death penalty in that case.
"The question remaining ... is at what point does that disparity
become constitutionally unacceptable."' 157 In the context of Title VII,
the disparity is cognizable if it is "substantial enough to raise an
inference of causation. That is, a plaintiff's statistical evidence must
reflect a disparity so great that it cannot be accounted for by
chance."' 158  This is a rule that courts have applied in some
constitutional race discrimination cases. 159  It is the rule that
Maryland's courts should apply in making sure that race does not
significantly contribute to death penalty decisions.' 
60
There are two other relevant provisions of Maryland's
Declaration of Rights: Articles 16 and 25. Article 16 governs
legislation, and prohibits "cruel and unusual pains and penalties."',
61
Article 25 applies to judicial punishments, and prohibits "cruel or
unusual punishment." 162  The constitutional assumption underlying
today's death penalty laws is that they are not cruel and unusual, and
therefore do not violate provisions like those in Articles 16 and 25,
because they eliminate "the arbitrariness and capriciousness
condemned by Furman."'63  In Calhoun v. State,164 the Maryland
Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of Maryland's death
156. Id. at 468 (Barkett, C.J., dissenting).
157. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 354 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
158. EEOC v. Joint Apprenticeship Comm., 186 F.3d 110, 117 (2nd Cir. 1999).
159. See, e.g., Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 400 (1986) (holding that even a flawed
regression analysis could be admissible to statistically show racial discrimination).
160. In United States v. Bass, 266 F.3d 532 (6th Cir. 2001), the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that a statistical study showing racial disparities at the
charging stage of the federal capital process is sufficient to justify discovery before a death
notice is filed.
161. MD.DECL.OFRTS. art. 16.
162. MD. DECL. OF RTS. art. 25. The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution
also prohibits "cruel and unusual punishments." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The Supreme
Court has held that Eighth Amendment applies "with special force" to the death penalty
because that penalty is so "severe." Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1194 (2005) (citing
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 856 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment)).
163. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 198 (1976).
164. 297 Md. 563, 468 A.2d 45 (1983).
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penalty statute based, in part, on a variant of this assumption: that
prosecutors would not exercise their discretion in "irrational,
inconsistent, or discriminatory" ways. 65 However, the 26 year history
of Maryland's post-Gregg death penalty law demonstrates that it
simply has not eliminated racial "arbitrariness and capriciousness."
During this period, more than 1300 death eligible murders have been
prosecuted; more than 350 death penalty notices have been filed; at
least 80 death sentences have been imposed; and eight men are now
under sentence of death, all but one for murdering white victims. In a
society that regularly pledges its commitment to equal justice, this is
unacceptable.
165. Id. at 605, 468A.2d at 64.
